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The implication of this research for anthropological and cognitive linguistics is, first and most 
generally, that more attention should be given to the interactional basis of communication. 
Understanding of deception goes to the foundations of human communicative behavior. In contrast 
to politeness and other non-aggressive semiotic modes of expression, deception carries the 
presumption of threatening intentions. The suggested model presupposes the account of the nature 
of deception as a special kind of the speaker’s cognitive scenario designed to gain an advantage 
over the addressee. More specifically, a deception scenario is defined as a non-linear knowledge 
and discourse structure – the construction by the speaker, by means of discursive and behavioral 
techniques, of two different (true and false) identities of himself. The difference between what is 
said and what is pragmatically indirectly calculated is basic for discourses of deception. Research 
in artificial intelligence seems to support the claim made in this paper that cognitive structures 
(scenarios) are crucial in determining the inference rules for discourse understanding. Viewed 
from this perspective, deceivers’ intentions have been proved to be reconstructable on the basis of 
propositional analysis of the cognitive scenarios being used. 
Keywords: discourse, deception, cognitive scenario, non-linear knowledge  structure, deceiver’s 
semiotic duplication, true vs false identity, true vs false proposition, actual vs possible world, direct 
vs indirect discourse, illegitimacy.
 © Siberian Federal University. All rights reserved
* Corresponding author E-mail address: snplotn@mail.ru
1. Theoretical Framework
The choice of deception as an object of 
investigation has been inspired, first and foremost, 
by the theory of politeness proposed by P. Brown 
and S. Levinson (1987).
Brown and Levinson’s theory is widely 
recognized as one of the most significant 
achievements made in the social sciences in the 
last decades. The importance of this theory is in 
the fact that it has revealed, for the first time, the 
existence of hitherto unknown principles of self-
organization of a human group, self-organization 
which is not imposed by some written laws but is 
determined by everyday interaction of speakers 
within a group. Politeness, as described by Brown 
and Levinson, can be obviously regarded as a 
fundamental principle of human self-organization 
because it is aimed, chiefly, at curbing aggression 
and, thus, at producing social order out of the 
chaos of non-organized human relationships. The 
fact that politeness is a phenomenon lying at the 
foundation of human social life is proved also by 
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its universality. It is inherent in any culture and 
any language and, as Brown and Levinson show, 
politeness strategies obtain generally, throughout 
the world.
Analysis of politeness raises the question of 
whether there exist any other phenomena of the 
same kind. It follows from Brown and Levinson’s 
arguments that the place of politeness is within a 
semiotics of peaceful vs aggressive intentions. As 
the say, “This semiotic system is then responsible 
for the shaping of much everyday interaction, 
and in so shaping it, constitutes a potent form of 
social control” (1987: 2). Brown and Levinson 
point to another phenomenon which might belong 
to such a semiotics alongside of politeness. It is 
joking, or joking relations. They define them as 
relations which carry a non-threatening intention, 
and thus enable a social group to control its 
internal aggression while retaining the potential 
for aggression both internally, and, especially, 
externally, in external competitive relations with 
other groups.
I argue that one more phenomenon belonging 
to the same class as politeness is deception. In 
their analysis of politeness Brown and Levinson 
have discovered that there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between linguistic markers 
and politeness. As they point out, politeness is 
imposed by the semantic structure of the whole 
utterance and is not characterized by markers in a 
simple signaling fashion which can be quantified 
(1987: 22). Likewise I argue that deception is 
expressed by the whole cognitive structure of 
discourse and not by some specific linguistic 
means. What classifies the given discourse as a 
deception is not the presence of such-and-such 
language means but the underlying knowledge 
structure – a cognitive scenario.
M. Minsky, who introduced the notions of 
a frame and a scenario, defines them practically 
in the same way. A frame is defined as a data-
structure for representing a stereotyped situation, 
like being in a certain kind of living room or 
going to a child’s birthday party. A scenario is 
understood by Minsky as a condensation of 
complex situations and sequences into compact 
words and symbols – again, like a birthday party 
scenario (Minsky 1980: 14-15).
Deception is viewed in this article as a 
planned activity, the planning being either 
conscious or unconscious. In this connection it is 
necessary to clarify in what sense the notion of 
planning is used and in what kind of entities it is 
analyzed.
Planning is understood here in the way in 
which it is treated in artificial intelligence, that is, 
as a formal process through which the target state 
is transformed into the goal state (for reference 
see Schank and Abelson 1977a, Wilensky 1983). 
In this sense the understanding of planning is 
close to that of problem solving as developed in 
cognitive science and psychology and defined as 
any kind of successful “means – ends” analysis.
Minsky does not connect scenarios/
frames with planning, explicitly. But his theory 
presupposes this connection very strongly. Thus 
he writes that the agent can have frames and that 
he can invent them. Schank and Abelson develop 
this distinction in their influential works. They 
propose two notions which reflect the difference 
between having and inventing – the notions of 
a script and of a plan; scripts handle stylized 
everyday situations whereas plans handle novel 
situations (1977b: 422). Schank and Abelson point 
out that a script is different from a plan in that it 
is used automatically by the actor. The actor is 
participating in a sequence of events much like 
other sequences which he has used many times 
before. He could teach his method to anyone who 
wanted to know (1977a: 62).
Schank and Abelson were also the first 
to describe the main constituents of the formal 
structure of scripts and plans. They analyze them 
in terms of actors, or agents, of roles played by 
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these agents, of goals, of action sequences, or 
event chains, leading to the goal.
In this article I use the term “scenario”, 
indiscriminately for old and new planning. 
Planning is understood as a mental process 
terminating in the retrieval of an appropriate 
scenario from memory or in the creation of a new 
scenario. Accordingly, planning of deception is 
defined as a process which leads the speaker to 
the choice of a deception scenario according to 
which he/she will act in the given circumstances.
2. A generalized structure  
of a deception scenario
By generalized structure of a deception 
scenario I understand the network of structural 
characteristics which are always associated with 
deception. These characteristics correspond 
to Minsky’s notions of “frame’s terminals”, or 
“frame’s top levels” which are defined as being 
fixed and always true for the given frame (1980).
The main “terminal” of a deception scenario 
is the deceiver – the scenario is “written” from 
the deceiver’s point of view, the other participants 
being involved in the structure imposed upon 
them by the deceiver.
From the perspective of the plurality of 
worlds (Lewis 1986b), the true “I” of the deceiver 
is his identity in his actual world; the false “I”, 
or false identity, is the deceiver’s counterpart 
invited from another, possible world. Each of the 
two “I”-s has an intention (a want) and a goal. The 
logical space between the intention and the goal 
is filled in by an event-sequence and a discourse. 
The deceived is not included in the generalized 
structure of a deception scenario – the place of 
the deceived is within the event-sequences. 
So, a deception scenario is a non-linear 
knowledge and discourse structure (see Fig. 1):
I treat deception as a phenomenon belonging 
to the class of phenomena defined by the general 
notion of insincerity, in the sense in which it is 
understood in artificial intelligence. Thus, P. 
Cohen and H. Levesque define insincerity as 
a notion independent of language denoting the 
agent’s desire to induce false beliefs in others 
(1990).
As Fig. 1 indicates, deception is understood 
as a verbal activity, and that is why it is necessary 
to differentiate it from similar activities pertaining 
to the sphere of insincerity, first and foremost from 
lying. Even the very fact that in many languages 
(for example, in English, Russian, Hebrew) there 
exist two different neutral words to denote lying 
and deceiving shows that they are perceived at 
the level of folk notions as different phenomena. 
 
 True “I”:     Intention ------ Event-Sequence and Discourse ------      Goal 
 
 
 
The Deceiver 
 
 
 
           False “I”:   Intention ------ Event-Sequence and Discourse ------       Goal 
 
I treat deception as a phenomenon belonging to the class of phenomena defined by 
the general notion of insincerity, in the sense in which it is understood in artificial 
intelligence. Thus, P. Cohen and H. Levesque define insincerity as a notion 
independent of language denoting the agent’s desire to induce false beliefs in 
others (1990).   
As Figure 1 indicates, deception is understood as a verbal activity, and that 
is why it is necessary to differentiate it from similar activities pertaining to the 
sphere of insincerity, first and foremost from lying. Even the very fact that in many 
languages (for example, in English, Russian, Hebrew) there exist two different 
neutral words to denote lying and deceiving shows that they are perceived at the 
level of folk notions as different phenomena. As I see it, lying and deceiving 
represent two kinds of falsehood – the falsehood of propositions in any given 
world (lying) and the falsehood of the identity of the speaker from the point of 
view of the world in which he/she performs an event-sequence and produces a 
discourse (deceiving). These two kinds of falsehood correspond to two kinds of 
truth singled out by D. Lewis: “… there are pairs of semantic relations: truth in a 
language L, truth in a population P; analyticity in L, analyticity in P, and so on” 
(1986a: 203). 
Fig. 1. Deception Scenario
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As I see it, lying and deceiving represent two 
kinds of falsehood – the falsehood of propositions 
in any given world (lying) and the falsehood of 
the identity of the speaker from the point of view 
of the world in which he/she performs an event-
sequence and produces a discourse (deceiving). 
These two kinds of falsehood correspond to 
two kinds of truth singled out by D. Lewis: “… 
there are pairs of semantic relations: truth in a 
language L, truth in a population P; analyticity in 
L, analyticity in P, and so on” (1986a: 203).
In my opinion, the main difference between 
deception and lying is in the level of their 
realization. Lying is a property of propositions 
and, derivatively, a property of sentences, or 
of similar units – statements, utterances, turns 
in conversation. Semantically, lying is the 
assigning by the speaker of the negative value to 
the proposition (truth +, lying –). Deception is a 
property of a discourse unit of some length and 
often of a discourse as a whole. Semantically, 
it is the construction by the speaker, by means 
of discursive and behavioral techniques, of 
two different identities of himself, and also 
the construction of two different propositions 
as goals of these identities. Being both verbal 
activities denoting insincerity, lying and 
deceiving are interwoven, but still they can be 
differentiated from each other, formally. When 
lying is sustained throughout a discourse unit of 
some length it becomes deception because the 
conversation is developed in such a way that there 
is a search for a possible world in which the false 
proposition expressed by the liar holds.
The other kinds of insincerity remain 
underdefined; it is even not clear how many of 
them can be singled out on proper formal grounds. 
It seems to me that in addition to lying and 
deception such identifiable kinds of insincerity 
are pretending and acting.
Pretending was studied by J. Austin in one 
of his philosophical essays. He understands 
pretending mostly as performing non-genuine 
non-verbal actions, such as pretending to 
be cleaning the windows now; or magicians 
pretending to saw girls. Or: “On a festive 
occasion you are ordered, for a forfeit, to pretend 
to be a hyena: going down on all fours, you make 
a few essays at hideous laughter and finally bite 
my calf” (1966: 204). 
As I see it, different kinds of insincerity 
can be explained and distinguished from one 
another on the basis of Lewis’s notion of the 
totality of worlds. Lying can be regarded as a 
purely this-worldly semantic phenomenon (true/
false proposition in this-world). Deception is 
an invitation of your other-worldly identity to 
this-world so that it would help you to achieve 
your this-worldly goal. Pretending is the same 
phenomenon as deception, only non-verbal. 
Thus, when you pretend to be a hyena you are 
inviting your counterpart from a very distant 
world (where you are a hyena). If in this situation 
you are also producing some “hyena’s discourse”, 
then, according to the definition given above, you 
are deceiving. (Rational agents won’t be deceived 
but, say, a child may be deceived by such discourse 
and behavior). As for acting, it can be defined 
as a phenomenon directly opposite in regard to 
deception.  In acting it is you who shift from your 
world to another world and enter there somebody 
else’s body (for example, an actor enters Othello’s 
body). You, as a this-worldly person, disappear, 
or you should disappear, at least. For acting to be 
good, you should “become” Othello and continue 
your life within his body. The fact that you leave 
this-world in acting is brought into prominence 
by the existence of the formal “border” between 
the two worlds – the frame of the stage, or of 
the TV screen. In short, in acting you depart to 
another world, in deception the other comes from 
his/her world. An interesting proof of such kind 
of travelling through the totality of worlds is the 
matter of dying – who may die? In deceiving and 
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pretending it is a this-worldly “I” who will die in 
case of some tragedy (for example, “you” but not 
“the hyena”). In acting, on the contrary, it is the 
other-worldly “I” who will die (Othello but not 
the actor).
This observation about dying brings out, 
again, the major distinction which should be made 
between lying, on the one hand, and deceiving, 
pretending, and acting, on the other hand. Lying 
is connected with one identity and one world. 
Deceiving, pretending, and acting are connected, 
each, with two identities and two worlds.
3. Classification of deception scenarios 
according to the abstracted goals  
of the deceiver’s true “I”
Deception scenarios can be successfully 
classified in accordance with different 
classifications of types of goals proposed in 
artificial intelligence, for example in accordance 
with the widely used classification of R. 
Schank and R. Abelson (1977a: 112-17). Their 
classification includes practically all kinds of 
occupations humans can possibly engage in: 
(1) S: Satisfaction goal (biological needs: 
S-hunger, S-sex, S-sleep, etc.);
(2) E: Enjoyment goal (E-travel, 
E-entertainment, E-exercise, E-competition, 
etc.);
(3) A: Achievement-goal (A-possessions, 
A-power position; A-good job, A-social 
relationships, A-skill, etc.);
(4) P: Preservation goal (P-preserving 
possessions);
(5) C: Crisis goal (a special case of P-goals 
set up to handle serious and imminent threats – 
C-health, C-fire, C-storm, etc.);
(6) I: Instrumental goal (any goal in the 
service of S-, E-, A-, P-, and C-goal). All the 
goals in the event-sequence leading to the Goal 
Proposition (see Figure 1 above) can be considered 
as instrumental.
I consider the types of goals singled out by 
Schank and Abelson as goals of the deceiver’s 
true “I” because they point to what the deceiver 
wants to get from the deceived in the deceiver’s 
actual world as the final result of the usage of this 
or that deception scenario.
Schank and Abelson’s classification 
actually combines two different factors – types 
of possessions the agent can have (for example, 
health, money, territory, etc.) and types of 
relationships between the agent and possessions 
(achievement of possessions, preservation of 
possessions, intermediate stages in the process of 
achievement or preservation).
In this connection I would like to mention 
one more classification of goals – that of Cohen 
and Levesque. Their classification suits the 
purpose of formalization better than that of 
Schank and Abelson, being based (as I see it) only 
on the relationship between the agent and the 
possessions. Two kinds of goals are distinguished – 
achievement goals and maintenance goals. 
Achievement goals are defined as those the agent 
believes to be currently false, maintenance goals 
are defined as those the agent believes to be true 
(1990: 50).
A more formal classification of the goals of 
the deceiver’s true “I” can be given, then. I think 
that every one of such goals can be presented as 
one of the two abstracted goals: (1) The Deceiver 
Achieves Possessions; (2) The Deceiver Preserves 
Possessions.
4. Classification of deception scenarios 
according to the abstracted goals  
of the deceiver’s false “I”
Goals of the deceiver’s false “I” are 
conceptualized as goals expressing what the 
deceiver wants to give the deceived. As has been 
mentioned earlier, the deceiver’s false identity is 
invited from the other worlds with the purpose 
of presenting it to the interlocutor, while the 
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true, this-worldly identity is retained for the 
deceiver himself. Now the problem is: What 
does this false identity offer the deceived in 
order to achieve his cooperation in the process 
of deceiving? 
I claim that the false identity of the deceiver 
offers the deceived the opportunity “to buy” one 
of the following three propositions:
1. (I AM THIS PERSON);
2. (I DO THIS ACTION);
3. (I HAVE THIS PERSONALITY 
TRAIT).
Actually, these propositions convey the 
same content of “existing” – existing as a body 
taken as a whole; existing as an action performed 
by this body; and existing as a trait belonging to 
this body. So, different aspects of the existence 
of the false “I” are brought into prominence, and, 
accordingly, one can single out three kinds of 
deception scenarios which are considered below.
The three propositions are given in the form 
of sentences in the present tense, but, of course, 
their content can refer also to the past and the 
future.
If we return to the above-given definition 
of insincerity as a false belief which one agent 
induces in the other agent, then, as I claim, it is 
these three propositions that should be believed 
by the deceived. In other words, these three 
propositions place deception among other kinds 
of insincerity because they allow deception to 
correspond to the definition of insincerity. What 
the deceived should believe is actually expressed 
by the noun – he/she should believe in a person, 
or in an action, or in a trait.
To sum up, deception scenarios are classified 
in accordance with the foregrounded aspect of 
the deceiver’s false identity, as it is perceived and 
believed by the deceived. The deceived believes, 
wrongly, that (1) the interlocutor is a person who 
has this name; or (2) the interlocutor is doing this 
action; or (3) the interlocutor has this trait.
4.1. The goal proposition  
(I AM THIS PERSON)
This kind of deception scenarios usually (but 
not always) refers to the  semiotic duplication of the 
deceiver’s body into two bodies bearing different 
names. Sometimes the function of proper names 
can be performed by other nominations, such as 
the nomination of the person’s profession, or of 
his title, or of his family status, or some other 
nomination which can be regarded as a substitute 
of a proper name.
The essence of a scenario of the given kind 
can be formulated in the following way: “If you 
believe that I am this person, that is, that I have 
this name, then, automatically, my true self has 
achieved/preserved possessions”. The task of 
the deceiver in such a scenario is to prove to the 
deceived that he/she is the person he/she claims to 
be. If the deceiver carries out this task successfully, 
the deceived recognizes the deceiver, say, as Mr. 
X, or in case of nominations other than proper 
names – as a member of a certain group. Proof, 
on the part of the deceiver, and recognition on the 
part of the deceived, will be considered as two 
most basic underlying characteristics of the kind 
of deception under consideration.
An interesting example of this kind of 
deception can be found in the novel “Moll 
Flanders” by D. Defoe. This example shows not 
only proof and recognition but also the process 
of invitation of counterparts from other worlds, 
and as such, it illustrates the assumptions given 
earlier:
I had dressed myself in a very mean habit, 
for as I had several shapes to appear in, I was 
now in an ordinary stuff gown, and a straw hat; 
and I placed myself at the door of The Three 
Cups Inn in St. John’s Street. There were several 
carriers used the inn, and the stage-coaches for 
Barnet, for Totterridge, and other towns that way 
stood always in the street in the evening, when 
they prepared to set out, so that I was ready for 
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anything that offered. The meaning was this: 
people come frequently with bundles and small 
parcels to those inns, and call for such carriers 
and coaches as they want, to carry them into 
the country; and there generally attend women, 
porters’ wives or daughters, ready to take in 
such things for the people that employ them. It 
happened very oddly that I was standing at the 
inn gate, and a woman that stood there before, 
and which was the porter’s wife belonging to the 
Barnet stage-coach, having observed me, asked 
if I waited for any of the coaches. I told her “Yes”, 
I waited for my mistress, that was coming to go to 
Barnet. She asked me who was my mistress, and 
I told her any madam’s name that came next me; 
but it seemed I happened upon a name a family 
of which lived at Hadley, near Barnet. I said no 
more to her, or she to me, a good while; but by 
and by, somebody calling her at a door a little 
way off, she desired me that if anybody called 
for the Barnet coach, I would step and call her 
at the house, which it seems was an alehouse. 
I said “Yes”, very readily, and away she went. 
She was no sooner gone but comes a wench and 
a child, puffing and sweating, and asks for the 
Barnet coach. I answered presently, “Here”. “Do 
you belong to the Barnet coach?” says she. “Yes, 
sweetheart,” said I; “what do you want?” “I want 
room for two passengers,” says she. “Where are 
they, sweetheart?”said I. “Here’s this girl; pray 
let her go into the coach,” says she, “and I’ll 
go and fetch my mistress.” “Make haste, then, 
sweetheart,” says I, “ for we may be full else.” 
The maid had a great bundle under her arm; so 
she put the child into the coach, and I said, “You 
had best put your bundle into the coach too.” 
“No,” said she; “I’m afraid somebody should 
slip it away from the child.” “Give it me, then,” 
said I. “Take it, then,” says she, “and be sure you 
take care of it.” “I’ll answer for it,” said I, “if it 
were twenty pounds value.” “There, take it then,” 
says she, and away she goes. As soon as I got the 
bundle, and the maid was out of sight, I walked 
away.
Here we can see the deceiver, Moll Flanders, 
and two deceived – the porter’s wife and the maid. 
First Moll proves to the porter’s wife that she is 
a servant and after the porter’s wife recognizes 
her as a servant, Moll gets possessions – she 
usurps the place of her interlocutor and becomes 
“a porter’s wife”, semiotically (she is allowed to 
act and speak like a member of porters’ wives’ 
group). Moll proves that she is a servant both 
through discourse and behavior. She gets dressed 
like a low-class woman (in an ordinary stuff 
gown, a blue apron, and a straw hat). She stands 
at the inn gate where servants usually stand 
waiting for their masters. So, the way to prove 
that she is a servant used by Moll Flanders is to 
exhibit a usual behavior of a servant. Evidently, 
the porter’s wife is satisfied with Moll’s non-
verbal behavior because she starts a conversation 
with her. In this conversation she puts Moll to a 
“discursive test”, so to speak. She asks Moll if 
she is waiting for any of the coaches. Moll gives 
an answer exhibiting her knowledge of particular 
facts (I told her “Yes”, I waited for my mistress, 
that was coming to go to Barnet). The porter’s 
wife asks Moll the name of her mistress and Moll 
again gives the correct factual answer (a name 
a family of which name lived at Hadley, near 
Barnet).
To generalize, the deceiver’s strategy in the 
given kind of deception is to invite from the worlds 
such a counterpart which may serve as a typical 
representative of the necessary social group – in 
this case, a typical servant. The deceived should 
be “satisfied” with the invited counterpart. Here 
we see that the porter’s wife puts Moll to the test 
before she “recognizes” her, that is, before she 
believes in the goal proposition of Moll’s false “I” 
(I AM A SERVANT). 
This situation corresponds to the definition 
of this kind of scenario given above – as soon 
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as the deceived believes that the deceiver is 
the person she claims to be, the deceiver gets 
possessions. These possessions are rather 
peculiar – the deceived gives the deceiver her 
place in life, her social status. Now Moll presents 
herself as belonging to the Barnet coach to the 
second deceived, the maid.
The fact that Moll has seized the porter’s 
wife’s place in life makes her second case of 
deception very easy, technically. The maid asks 
her only one question (Do you belong to the 
Barnet coach?).  She is satisfied with Moll’s 
positive answer and does not put her to any 
further test. The fact that Moll has the right to be 
at the place reserved for porters’ wives proves, by 
itself, without special inquiries, that she belongs 
to the necessary group of people.
I draw the conclusion that the most peculiar 
feature of this kind of deception scenarios is the 
fact that the false “I” of the deceiver struggles 
for its recognition by the deceived. The 
recognition is achieved, firstly, by establishing 
the fact of her belonging to the social group of 
low-class women. The nominations “servant” 
and “porter’s wife” perform, practically, the 
function of proper names. The interlocutors 
believe that the person who is now in front of 
them bears the name “Servant”; they believe 
that she is indeed a servant, on these grounds 
she is admitted into their group and trusted. 
Secondly, the deceiver is recognized as a 
servant because she satisfies the interlocutors’ 
expectations producing the “correct” discourse 
of a servant which is analyzed by the deceived 
and accepted as appropriate. When the deceiver 
achieves the recognition of her false identity she 
gets from the group what any servant would get 
in the same circumstances – the right to stand 
near the stage-coaches. So, the essence of this 
kind of deception scenarios is to make your 
interlocutor believe that you are this person and 
if he believes you, you will receive from him 
the treatment which he would give to the person 
whose place you have managed to usurp.
The relation of belonging is viewed as 
fundamental for the given kind of deception. In 
such scenarios the deceiver proves that he/she 
belongs and the deceived acknowledges it. So in 
any example which can be referred to this kind 
of deception the analyst or, say, the computer 
program should look for the logical relationship: 
belonging (proof; recognition).
Deception scenarios with the abstracted goal 
proposition of the deceiver’s false “I” formulated 
as (I AM THIS PERSON) demonstrate two kinds 
of illegitimacy. (Illegitimacy is understood as 
anything which is “wrong” from the standpoint of 
this-world, or actual world). Firstly, the deceiver 
bears his/her name illegitimately. Secondly, the 
deceiver tries to achieve what can be called an 
illegitimate entrance – to infiltrate into the group 
of the deceived.
In order to identify a deception scenario 
under the title (I AM THIS PERSON) the 
human agent or the computer program should 
answer the following questions: “Does my 
interlocutor bear this name illegitimately? If so, 
does my interlocutor want to enter my group, 
illegitimately?”
4.2. The goal proposition  
(I DO THIS ACTION)
In this kind of deception scenarios the 
deceiver does not have to solve any problems 
connected with the name of his false identity – it 
is not disputed. The name of the deceiver’s false 
identity either coincides with the name of his true 
identity and as such it is known to the participants 
as an indisputable fact, or it is taken for granted, 
without any ensuing consequences, or it is not 
important at all. In this kind of deception the 
deceiver gets possessions if she induces in the 
deceived the belief that she is doing (or did, had 
done, etc.) a certain action.
– 597 –
Svetlana N. Plotnikova. Cognitive Scenarios of Discourses of Deception
So, in this kind of deception the 
foregrounded aspect of the deceiver’s false 
“I” is the action performed by this false “I”. 
Such foregrounded action permeates the whole 
scenario, in the same way as the assertion of the 
name of the deceiver’s false identity permeates 
the scenario of the previous type. The formal 
method of identification of such scenarios 
is to give them a title in accordance with the 
foregrounded action. For example, the following 
scenario from the novella “The Captain’s 
Doll” by D.H. Lawrence can be entitled (I AM 
BUYING IT). The subject-matter is as follows. 
An English officer, Captain Hepburn, falls in 
love with a German aristocrat Hannele during 
the occupation of Germany after the First World 
War. Hannele and her friend Mitchka make 
dolls and sell them in their studio, for a living. 
Captain Hepburn’s wife gets to know about her 
husband’s love-affair and comes to Germany. 
She visits Hannele’s studio and executes (I AM 
BUYING IT) scenario:
Entered the little lady in her finery and 
crumpled prettiness.
“You’ve got a charming studio – charming – 
perfectly delightful!”
Mitchka gave a slight ironic bow, and said in 
her odd, plangent English:
“Oh, yes. We like it very much also.”
Hannele, who had dodged behind a screen, 
now came quickly forth.
“Oh, how do you do!” smiled the elderly 
lady. “I heard there were two of you. Now which 
is which, if I may be so bold? This” – and she 
gave a winsome smile and pointed a white kid 
finger at Mitchka – is she –?”
“Annamaria von Prielau-Carolath,” said 
Mitchka, slightly bowing.
“Oh!” – and the white kid finger jerked 
away. “Then this –”
“Johanna zu Rassentlow,” said Hannele, 
smiling.
“Ah, yes! Countess von Rassentlow! And 
this is Baroness von – von – but I shall never 
remember even if you tell me, for I am awful at 
names. Anyhow, I shall call one Countess and 
the other Baroness. That will do, won’t it, for 
poor me! Now I should like awfully to see your 
things, if I may. I want to buy a little present 
to take back to England with me. I suppose I 
shan’t have to pay the world in duty on things 
like these, shall I?”
“Oh no,” said Mitchka. “No duty. Toys, you 
know, they – there is –” Her English stammered 
to an end, and she turned to Hannele.
“They don’t charge duty on toys, and the 
embroideries they don’t notice,” said Hannele.
“Oh, well. then I’m all right,” said the 
visitor. “I hope I can buy something really nice! I 
see a perfectly lovely jumper over there, perfectly 
delightful. But a little too gay for me, I’m afraid. 
I’m not quite so young as I was, alas.” She smiled 
her winsome little smile, showing her pretty teeth 
and the old pearls in her ears shook.
“I’ve heard so much about your dolls. I hear 
they are perfectly exquisite, quite works of art. 
May I see some, please?”
“Oh, yes,” came Mitchka’s invariable 
answer.
The conversation is continued in this way, 
the lady makes her purchases and Hannele does 
not realize that the buyer is her lover’s wife. In 
contrast to pretending which has been defined 
earlier as doing non-genuine non-verbal action 
(for example, magicians pretending to saw girls), 
in this example the action of buying is genuine – 
the lady is really buying things. But it is only her 
false identity presented to her interlocutors that 
has the goal to buy things. Her true identity is 
that of a wife who wants to make acquaintance 
of her rival.
The peculiarity of this example is that the 
action performed by the deceiver’s false “I” is 
imposed upon the deceived, socially. Hannele’s 
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business is to sell her works and she cannot refuse 
anyone, without an obvious reason, to perform 
the action of buying in her studio. So any buyer 
can get acquainted with her, in principle. From 
this point of view such deception is very easy, 
both technically and intellectually.
Like in the previous kind of deception in 
which the deceiver gets possessions automatically, 
if his false identity is recognized by the deceived, 
in this kind of deception scenarios the deceiver 
also gets possessions automatically, on condition 
that her action is permitted by the deceived. The 
action of buying is permitted by Hannele and the 
deceiver automatically gets possessions – she 
makes acquaintance of Hannele.
Summing it up, in this kind of deception 
scenarios the deceiver adds an illegitimate 
action to the action performed by her in her 
actual world. The basic logical relationship 
underlying such scenarios can be formulated 
as doing (right; permission). This means that 
the deceiver’s false “I” claims its right to do a 
certain action and this claim should be permitted 
by the deceived.
4.3. The goal proposition  
(I HAVE THIS PERSONALITY TRAIT)
The essence of this kind of deception 
scenarios consists in the fact that the deceiver’s 
false “I” exhibits a certain personality trait and 
if the deceived believes the proposition (I HAVE 
THIS PERSONALITY TRAIT), the deceiver 
automatically gets possessions.
The approach to the notion of personality 
proposed by Y. Scott, D. Osgood and C. Peterson, 
who claim that there is no basis for concluding 
that there is a thing called personality possessed 
by individuals, is radical but useful. They assert 
that personality is a set of characteristics imputed 
to the individual by an outside observer to 
account for stabilities in behavior. They define 
a personality trait as a behavior tendency, or 
stability, for example generosity is a tendency to 
behave in a generous manner (1979: 16).
For the sake of convenience and simplicity of 
analysis I will treat a personality trait as an entity 
whose linguistic nomination can be reduced, 
sometimes after transformations, to an adjective, 
for example, rich, mad, foolish, modest, generous, 
kind-hearted, etc.
So, in this kind of deception scenarios the 
foregrounded aspect of the deceiver’s false “I” 
is some personality trait. This trait permeates 
the whole scenario, in the same way as the 
name and the action permeate the previous two 
kinds of deception. The scenario can be entitled 
in accordance with the foregrounded trait, for 
example in the following passage Moll Flanders 
executes the scenario (I AM RICH):
The captain’s lady, in short, put this project 
into my head, and told me if I would be ruled by 
her I should certainly get a husband of fortune. 
The first step she put me upon was to call her 
cousin, and go to a relation’s house of hers in 
the country, where she directed me, and where 
she brought her husband to visit me, and calling 
me cousin, she worked matters so about, that 
her husband and she together invited me most 
passionately to come to town and live with them. 
In the next place she tells her husband that I had 
at least 1500 pounds fortune, and that I was like 
to have a great deal more. It was enough to tell 
her husband, there needed nothing on my side. 
I was but to sit still and wait the event, for it 
presently went all over the neighbourhood that 
the young widow at Captain–’s was a fortune, 
that she had at least 1500 pounds, and perhaps 
a great deal more, and that the captain said so; 
and if the captain was asked at any time about 
me, he had no scruple to affirm it, though he knew 
not one word of the matter than his wife had told 
him so; and in this he thought no harm, for he 
really believed it to be so. With the reputation 
of this fortune, I presently found myself blessed 
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with admirers enough and that I had my choice 
of men.
This deception scenario proves to be 
successful – having chosen her man Moll 
Flanders marries him. The deceiver’s false “I” 
wants to exhibit. or to have, a certain personality 
trait – that of being rich. She displays this trait in 
a variety of ways. With the help of her friend, the 
captain’s wife, she presents herself as a person 
having relatives and acquaintances – she goes to 
live first with her friend’s relatives as a cousin, 
and then with the family of her friend. Being a 
relative of people of a certain class displays that 
Moll must have approximately the same income as 
they. She also disseminates information about the 
exact sum of her fortune, and she does it through 
a reliable source – her friend’s husband. Such a 
display of the trait of being rich is observed by 
the deceived – the whole neighbourhood. They, 
in their turn, attribute the observed trait to Moll 
(It presently went all over the neighbourhood that 
the young widow at Captain–’s was a fortune). 
After the deceived believe the goal proposition of 
the deceiver’s false “I” (I AM RICH), the deceiver 
gets possessions – she gets married.
The logical relationship underlying this 
kind of deception can be formulated as having 
(display; attribution). It means that the deceiver’s 
false “I” displays a certain trait, illegitimately, 
and the deceived attributes the given trait to the 
deceiver as an outside observer.
5. The correlation between deception 
scenarios and life scenarios  
from the perspective  
of artificial intelligence
As is well established in artificial intelligence, 
up to a point, a computer may be programmed to 
take cognitive scenarios into account, thus, the 
details of deception scenarios, singled out in this 
paper, offer some support for the creation of the 
inference rules used in AI-programs, namely, 
the rules of reasoning “backwards” from the 
deceiver’s two conflicting goals. 
Life scenarios are treated in artificial 
intelligence as predetermined stereotyped 
event-sequences performed by people in their 
everyday life. Life scenarios, or scripts, include 
according to Schank and Abelson (1977 a,b) 
such scenarios as BUS, MUSEUM-GOING, 
TRAIN, RESTAURANT; or: FLATTERER, 
JEALOUS SPOUSE, GOOD SAMARITAN, 
PICKPOCKET, SPY; or: BECOMING RICH, 
DO GOOD-WORKS, HONESTY, GOOD 
PROFESSOR, and so on. People are familiar with 
an immense number of life scenarios in the sense 
that they know what event-sequences should be 
performed by them in this or that situation.
Since the identification of the deceiver’s 
false “I”  and its characteristics is of paramount 
importance for the formal analysis of deception 
it is necessary to further clarify the process 
through which the analyzing system could arrive 
at the formulation of the goal proposition of the 
deceiver’s false “I”. 
I suggest the following procedure. The 
analyzing system should identify the logical 
relationships underlying the three types of 
deception scenarios singled out above. These 
relationships are as follows:
(1) belonging (proof, recognition);
(2) doing (right, permission);
(3) having (display, attribution).
These relationships should be further 
specified. Each of them is expressed by three 
words. The analyzing system should know that the 
first two words characterize the deceiver’s false 
“I” and the third word characterizes the deceived. 
This characterization has the following meaning. 
The deceiver’s false “I” does what is denoted by 
the first word through doing what is denoted by 
the second word. The deceived endorses what is 
being done by the deceiver’s false “I” by doing 
what is denoted by the third word.
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In (1) the deceiver’s false “I” does belonging 
through doing proof, that is, the deceiver proves 
that he/she has a certain name and belongs to 
a certain group. The deceived endorses the 
deceiver’s belonging by doing recognition (the 
deceived recognizes the deceiver as the person 
who has this name).
In (2) the deceiver’s false “I” does doing 
through claiming right (the deceiver claims 
the right to, and then does the action). The 
deceived endorses the deceiver’s action through 
permission.
In (3) the deceiver’s false “I” does having 
through doing display (of a personality trait). The 
deceived endorses the deceiver’s having the given 
personality trait through attribution of that trait 
to the deceiver.
To specify further, the analyzing system 
should know what kind of illegitimacy (from 
the standpoint of the actual world) accompanies 
each kind of these logical relationships. In (1) 
the deceiver bears his name illegitimately, that 
is, in the actual world the deceiver has another 
name. In (2) the deceiver adds an illegitimate 
action to the action performed by him in the 
actual world. In (3) the deceiver displays an 
illegitimate personality trait which cannot be 
referred to his actual-worldly behavior by an 
outside observer.
The analyzing system should also look 
for the markers of illegitimate entrance which 
is characteristic of deception in general. The 
illegitimate entrance can be of two kinds: either 
the deceiver enters the group of flesh-and-blood 
people to which the deceived belongs, or the 
deceiver induces the deceived to enter an illusory 
group of counterparts created by him.
My inference is that the event-sequence 
performed by the agent, when it is completed to 
a certain degree, evokes one of the three logical 
relationships mentioned above, if of course we 
deal with deception. Or vice versa, each logical 
relationship, taken in its formulation given above, 
can become a general title for the discourse and 
behavior produced by the agent, if the agent 
deceives.
In these terms, the identification of this or 
that discourse as a deception becomes easy. The 
analyzing system should put the formulation 
of each logical relationship as the title of the 
discourse and see which of them, if any, suits the 
discourse.
6. Conclusion
The work done in cognitive linguistics raises 
two questions central to the model proposed in 
this paper. On the one hand, are there, as the model 
would predict, discernable patterns of language 
use characteristic of deception, and on the other, 
are discourses of deception interpretable in terms 
of parameters provided in the model? As I have 
found out, the unfolding of deception, that is, 
the gradual creation of the scenario which will 
eventually lead from the deceiver’s intention to 
his goal is realized in two event-sequences – one 
of them is performed by the deceiver’s true “I”; 
the other is performed by the deceiver’s false “I”.
My account basically suggests that 
understanding deception is a matter of 
reconstructing deceivers’ communicative 
intentions and goals from their discourses. The 
question of a universal generalized structure 
of deception scenarios vs their propositional 
particulars is highlighted. 
The problem of the unfolding of deception 
brings out the more general problem of the 
relationship between deception scenarios 
and the so-called life scenarios. Deception is 
different from a life scenario not qualitatively, 
but quantitatively. As my analysis has shown, a 
deception scenario is a super-scenario because it 
is a combination of two life scenarios at a time. 
One of these two life scenarios is primary, from 
the point of view of the speaker’s interests (the 
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scenario performed by the true “I”); the other life 
scenario is instrumental (the scenario performed 
by the false “I”).
It is the goal of the deceiver’s false identity 
which is presented to the deceived; so, the event-
sequence performed by the false identity is at the 
foreground and the event-sequence performed by 
the true identity is at the background, being often 
insignificant, broken, or altogether absent. The 
internal structure of discourse is adapted to the 
realization of the goal of the false identity.
My proposal for a computer program for 
automatic understanding of deception which 
fulfils the criteria of the three types of goal 
propositions will probably remain beyond 
the boundaries of feasibility for a long time, 
but it does demonstrate both the need for a 
greater contribution of ideas from cognitive 
and discourse linguistics to work in artificial 
intelligence, and the necessity to present them 
in a form that can be applied by computer 
programmers.
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Когнитивные сценарии обмана  
и их дискурсивная реализация
С.Н. Плотникова
Иркутский государственный 
лингвистический университет 
Россия 664025, Иркутск, ул. Ленина 8
В статье доказывается, что исследование обмана является важной составной частью 
изучения интерактивных параматров коммуникации. Обман, направленный на выражение 
враждебных интенций, противопоставляется вежливости и другим неагрессивным типам 
коммуникативного поведения. Выявляется когнитивная природа обмана – лежащий в его 
основе особый когнитивный сценарий, представляющий собой нелинейную структуру 
знания, отражающую семиотическое удвоение обманывающего: одновременную реализацию 
его истинной и фальшивой идентичности. Определяется алгоритм дискурсивного 
конструирования фальшивой идентичности: замена действительного мира возможным, 
прямого дискурса – непрямым.  Анализируется механизм последовательного дискурсивного 
выражения ложных пропозиций в трех базовых типах когнитивных сценариев обмана.
Ключевые слова: дискурс, обман, когнитивный сценарий, нелинейная структура знаний, 
семиотическое удвоение обманывающего, истинная vs фальшивая идентичность, истинная vs 
ложная пропозиция, действительный vs возможный, прямой vs непрямой дискурс, 
нелегитимность.
